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Abstract: Don’t form beliefs on the basis of coin flips or random guesses. More generally, don’t 
take belief gambles: if a proposition is no more likely to be true than false given your total body 
of evidence, don’t go ahead and believe that proposition. Few would deny this seemingly 
innocuous piece of epistemic advice. But what, exactly, is wrong with taking belief gambles? 
Philosophers have debated versions of this question at least since the classic dispute between 
William Clifford and William James near the end of the 19th century. Here I reassess the 
normative standing of belief gambles from the perspective of epistemic decision theory. The main 
lesson of the paper is a negative one: it turns out that we need to make some surprisingly strong 
and hard-to-motivate assumptions to establish a general norm against belief gambles within a 
decision-theoretic framework. I take this to pose a dilemma for epistemic decision theory: it 
forces us to either (i) make seemingly unmotivated assumptions to secure a norm against belief 
gambles, or (ii) concede that belief gambles can be rational after all. 
Keywords: Belief gambles, epistemic risk, epistemic consequentialism, epistemic value, 
epistemic decision theory 
1. Introduction 
Mrs. Cautious is about to flip a fair coin. What will it be? Heads or tails? She’s reluctant to 
commit to an answer. After all, she takes it, the coin is just as likely to come up heads as it is 
tails. So, rather than forming an arbitrary opinion on the matter, she much prefers to suspend 
judgment. 
Mr. Hazard is pondering the universe. Is the number of stars odd or even? He can’t be 
sure. In fact, he sees no reason to be inclined one way or the other. “But,” he thinks to himself, 
“nothing ventured, nothing gained.” So, rather than forming no opinion at all, he much 
prefers to form an arbitrary opinion on the matter. 
When you find yourself flipping coins or pondering the universe, should you follow the 
lead of Mrs. Cautious or Mr. Hazard? The vast majority of epistemologists—at least among 
those who maintain that it is your evidence that determines what you should believe—would 
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side with Mrs. Cautious. According to them, you shouldn’t take 50-50 belief gambles 
(henceforth just belief gambles): when a proposition is no more likely to be true than false 
given your total evidence, don’t go ahead and believe that proposition. Few would deny this 
seemingly innocuous piece of epistemic advice.1 
But what, exactly, is wrong with taking belief gambles? This question echoes the subject 
matter of the classic dispute between William Clifford and William James near the end of the 
19th century.2 Clifford famously summed up his position by deeming it “wrong always, 
everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.” It’s notoriously 
vague what Clifford took to count as “sufficient evidence.” But he presumably had in mind 
an evidential threshold well above 50-50 chance. 
James didn’t buy it. According to him, such an exacting evidential standard has 
implausible consequences for how vigorously we should pursue what he conceived of as the 
“two great commandments” of inquiry: gaining true beliefs and avoiding false ones. James’ 
central observation was that the pursuit of truth need not go hand in hand with the avoidance 
of error. In fact, the best means to the former aim—excessive credulity, the willingness to 
believe anything, however improbable—is also the worst means to the latter aim. And, 
conversely, the best means to the latter aim—excessive caution, the unwillingness to believe 
anything, however probable—is also the worst means to the former aim. Thus, we inevitably 
face a challenge of how to weigh truth-seeking against error-avoidance. 
How to navigate this balancing act? Clifford’s evidence norm is an effective guard 
against false belief, since it only permits us to form beliefs that are highly likely to be true. But 
it often comes at the cost of losing out on the truth, since many true propositions will fail to 
meet the high evidential standard. This led James to conclude that Clifford’s evidence norm 
effectively asks us to place more weight on error-avoidance than on truth-seeking.  
According to James, however, reason doesn’t by itself compel us to accept any particular 
weighing of the fundamental goals of inquiry. As he saw it, this must be decided by our own 
“passional nature.” While Mrs. Cautious (and her fellow conservatives) will tend to place 
                                               
1 Here is a potential exception: some epistemologists have recently argued that there can be more than one 
rational response to a given body of evidence (e.g., Kelly 2013 and Schoenfield 2014). When taken to the 
extreme, this “permissivist” view opens up the possibility that an agent is sometimes be permitted to believe q 
and permitted to believe ~q at the same time, in which case the agent is permitted to believe at least one 
proposition that is no more likely to be true than false (since q and ~q can’t both be more likely to be true than 
false). I’ll return to the connection between permissivism and belief gambles in §4.3. 
2 Clifford (1877), James (1896). 
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more weight on error-avoidance than on truth-seeking, Mr. Hazard (and his fellow liberals) 
will tend to place more weight on truth-seeking than on error-avoidance. Neither weighing 
is any more rational than the other. People simply have different temperaments, and this is 
reflected in the way they trade off the fundamental goals of inquiry. 
I suspect that few contemporary epistemologists would be prepared to follow James in 
placing this amount of epistemic significance on our passional lives. But the Jamesian 
challenge doesn’t become obsolete for that reason. Far from it. Anyone who wants to 
maintain that belief is governed by some kind of evidence norm ultimately owes a story about 
why evidence gets to have such normative significance. And, as James pointed out, this may 
prove to be a difficult task. In particular, it’s far from obvious why we should consider it more 
important to avoid false beliefs than to gain true ones. 
So much for the historical debate between Clifford and James. How does all of this relate 
to the normative standing of belief gambles? We can understand the claim that belief gambles 
are irrational as a very minimal version of Clifford’s evidence norm. Whatever else might be 
said about what counts as “sufficient evidence,” I take it that the evidential threshold should, 
at the very least, lie above 50-50 chance. Of course, Clifford presumably had a much higher 
evidential standard in mind. But even a very minimal evidence norm—one that merely 
renders belief gambles irrational—will be afflicted by the Jamesian challenge. After all, 
someone who considers it just as important to gain true beliefs as to avoid false ones should, 
it seems, be prepared to join Mr. Hazard in taking belief gambles. Thus, anyone who wants 
to maintain that belief gambles are irrational faces essentially the same challenge that James 
leveled against Clifford’s evidence norm. And given that most of us think that belief gambles 
are irrational, this is a challenge that most of us must face. 
Hence our question: what, exactly, is wrong with taking belief gambles? Or, to put the 
question in a more exploratory spirit, how might we go about vindicating a general norm 
against belief gambles? Here I’ll approach this question from the perspective of epistemic 
decision theory. The motivation to do so stems from the recent surge of interest in providing 
decision-theoretic arguments for various putative epistemic norms such as Probabilism 
(Joyce 1998), Conditionalization (Oddie 1997; Greaves & Wallace 2006), Rational Reflection 
(Easwaran 2013), the Principle of Indifference (Pettigrew 2016a), the Lockean Thesis (Dorst 
2019), and more. To my mind, many of these norms seem much less innocuous than the 
requirement to not form beliefs on the the basis of coin flips or random guesses. Thus, it’s 
natural to hope that epistemic decision theory might have the resources to vindicate a norm 
against belief gambles. 
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However, and this is the main lesson of the paper, it turns out that we need to make some 
surprisingly strong and hard-to-motivate assumptions to establish a general norm against 
belief gambles. The upshot will be that epistemic decision theory faces a dilemma that hasn’t 
been satisfactorily addressed: it forces us to either (i) make seemingly unmotivated 
assumptions to secure a norm against belief gambles, or (ii) concede that belief gambles can 
be rational after all. 
To set up this dilemma, I’ll begin by introducing the decision-theoretic framework that 
I’ll be working with, and use it to formulate a precise norm against belief gambles. This is the 
business of §2. In §§3-4, I’ll go on to explore various proposals for how to validate this norm, 
and argue that each proposal rests on implausible or unmotivated assumptions. In §5, I close 
with some thoughts on how the main lessons of the paper bear more generally on the 
prospects for epistemic decision theory. 
2. Background on Epistemic Decision Theory 
It has long been commonplace to use formal, decision-theoretic methods to reason about 
norms of action. Less so when it comes to norms of belief. However, over the past two decades, 
a growing number of epistemologists have started to explore how decision-theoretic methods 
might be used to justify various putative epistemic norms. Continuing this line of work, I’d 
like to embed the requirement against taking belief gambles within a simple decision-
theoretic framework. 
Our first ingredient is a set, W, of epistemically possible worlds (henceforth just “worlds”), 
which represent all the different ways the world might be for all the agent under consideration 
can be certain of. For example, if the agent is uncertain about whether the number of stars in 
the universe is odd or even, there will be worlds in W representing the number of stars as odd, 
and there will be worlds in W representing the number of stars as even. By contrast, if the 
agent is certain that the number of stars is greater than the number of galaxies, every world 
in W will represent the number of stars as being greater than the number of galaxies.3 
Propositions are modeled as subsets of W: that is, we think of a proposition, q, as the set 
of worlds in W that represent q as being true. Truth is represented in terms of set-
membership: that is, q is true at a world w iff w ∈ q. Logical operations are defined in terms 
                                               
3 Throughout, I’ll assume that the number of worlds in W is finite. This is not to say that agents can only ever 
represent finitely many possibilities. However, the infinite case introduces some technical complications that 
I’d like to sidestep for present purposes. 
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of set-theoretic ones: ~q = W ‒ q, p ∧ q = p ∩ q, and so on. The agent’s evidential situation is 
represented by a probability function, P, which assigns real numbers between 0 and 1 to 
propositions. For each proposition, q, P(q) is the evidential probability of q: that is, the 
probability of q given the agent’s total body of evidence. 
While decision theorists typically define a “menu” of options for agents to choose from, 
we will define a set, A, of doxastic attitudes (henceforth just “attitudes”) that agents can adopt 
towards any given proposition. If a is an attitude and q is a proposition, I’ll write “a(q)” to 
mean that the agent takes attitude a towards q. When context allows, I’ll omit reference to 
the proposition and simply write “a” to mean that the agent takes attitude a towards the 
contextually given proposition. 
I’ll make three assumptions about the attitudes in A. First, I’ll be working with a 
relatively coarse-grained distinction between belief (“b”), suspension of judgment (“s”), and 
disbelief (“d”). This is not to say that the Jamesian challenge presupposes any particular 
individuation of doxastic attitudes. Indeed, I suspect that a very similar challenge will arise in 
a credence-based setting.4 But to keep things relatively simple, I’ll focus on the belief case 
here. Second, I’ll assume that there is no difference between disbelieving q and believing ~q. 
Finally, I’ll assume that suspension of judgment is incompatible with belief (and disbelief): 
that is, if you believe (or disbelieve) q, you thereby don’t suspend judgment about q. 
Otherwise, I won’t make any substantive assumptions about what combinations of attitudes 
it is possible for agents to have. For example, I won’t foreclose the possibility of believing a 
proposition and its negation at the same time. 
                                               
4 For those interested, here is a brief excursion into accuracy-first epistemology: it might be tempting to think 
that we automatically get a norm against “credence gambles” as long as we use a proper scoring rule, since proper 
scoring rules have the property of being “immodest” or “self-recommending:” roughly, they expect themselves 
to be most accurate. For example, an agent with a credence of 50% in q won’t expect any other credence to be 
more accurate, and so won’t be prepared to “gamble” by moving to a credence of 80% in q (assuming that the 
agent seeks to maximize expected accuracy calculated with respect to his or her own credence function).  
However, the self-recommendation property of proper scoring rules doesn’t by itself get us a norm against 
credence gambles, since it says nothing about how the rational credence relates to the available evidence. To get 
a norm against credence gambles, one would need to add a further assumption to the effect that the rational 
credence in q is identical to the evidential probability of q. But in doing so, one effectively assumes that it is more 
important to avoid high credences in falsehoods than it is to gain high credences in truths. Hence, we are left 
with essentially the same Jamesian challenge that I’ve set out to address in this paper.  
Further discussion of how the accuracy-based approach to epistemology relates to the debate between 
Clifford and James can be found in Joyce (2009, §9) and Pettigrew (2016b). See also Williamson (2000, ch. 10) 
for discussion of the relation between evidential probability and rational credence. 
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Importantly, epistemic decision theory—or, in any case, the version of epistemic 
decision theory that I’ll be focusing on here—is based on a consequentialist view of rational 
belief. To a first approximation, epistemic consequentialism is the view that the rational status 
of any given doxastic attitude is determined solely by its conduciveness (or lack thereof) to 
that which has fundamental epistemic value, whatever it is. In principle, this view of epistemic 
rationality is compatible with many different theories about what has epistemic value. 
However, the predominant value theory among epistemic decision theorists is one according 
to which true belief is the sole bearer of fundamental epistemic value, whereas false belief is 
the sole bearer of fundamental epistemic disvalue. Following Goldman (1999), I’ll refer to 
this version of epistemic consequentialism as “Veritism.” 
To implement these consequentialist commitments, let’s define a value function, V, 
which assigns real numbers to attitudes at worlds. If a is an attitude (towards a contextually 
given proposition), and w is a world, then V(a,w) is the epistemic value of having a in w. At 
this point, I won’t make any other assumptions about V, but later on I’ll consider various 
additional constraints that one might want to impose on V. 
Finally, let R be a decision rule that assigns sets of attitudes to propositions. If q is a 
proposition, R(q) is the set of attitudes that the agent in question is rationally permitted (or 
just “permitted”) to adopt towards q. So, for example, if b ∈ R(q), the agent is permitted to 
believe q; and, if s ∉ R(q), the agent isn’t permitted to suspend judgment about q. 
With these ingredients in hand, we can give a precise formulation of the claim that belief 
gambles are irrational: 
Belief Gamble Aversion  
You’re permitted to believe a proposition only if the evidential probability of that 
proposition is greater than 50%: 
[b ∈ R(q)] → [P(q) > .5] 
Note that Belief Gamble Aversion provides only a necessary condition for permissible belief: 
it says that you aren’t permitted to believe a proposition if the evidential probability of that 
proposition is no greater than 50%, but it says nothing about whether you are permitted to 
believe a proposition if the evidential probability of that proposition is greater than 50%. 
As we will see, Belief Gamble Aversion isn’t automatically rendered valid or invalid by 
the decision-theoretic framework outlined above. This is important because it allows us to 
explore various ways of validating Belief Gamble Aversion by imposing additional constraints 
on our framework. The goal of the next two sections is to do just that. 
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3. Dominance and Minimal Veritism 
Plausibly, you shouldn’t choose an option if there is an alternative option that is better no 
matter what. In decision-theoretic parlance: if option A is dominated by option B, you 
shouldn’t choose option A. Doing so would effectively amount to ignoring an option that is 
guaranteed to make you better off—and this seems patently irrational.5 
When adapted to the present framework, the claim that dominated options are always 
impermissible becomes: 
Dominance6 
You’re permitted to have an attitude, a—that is, a ∈ R(q)—only if no other attitude, a’, 
dominates a, where a’ dominates a iff: 
(i) V(a’,w) ≥ V(a,w), for all worlds w; and 
(ii) V(a’,w) > V(a,w), for some world w. 
As stated, Dominance states merely a necessary condition on permissible attitudes: it says 
that dominated attitudes aren’t permitted, but it says nothing about whether undominated 
attitudes are permitted. In §4.1, I’ll consider alternative decision rules that include a sufficient 
condition as well. But I’d like to begin by considering whether a minimal decision rule like 
Dominance might be enough to vindicate Belief Gamble Aversion. 
To go along with Dominance, I’ll impose a few different constraints on the value 
function, which I take to capture a very minimal commitment to Veritism:7 
Minimal Veritism 
Ranking: If w ∈ q, then V(b,w) > V(s,w) > V(d,w). 
Extensionality: If {w,w’} ⊆ q or {w,w’} ⊆ ~q, then V(a,w) = V(a,w’). 
Equivalence: If w ∈ q and w’ ∉ q: 
(i) V(b,w) = V(d,w’); and 
(ii) V(d,w) = V(b,w’); and 
(iii) V(s,w) = V(s,w’). 
                                               
5 Complications arise in cases where every available option is dominated by some other option. But for present 
purposes, we can safely ignore this subtlety. See Pettigrew (2016c) and Briggs (2018) for discussion of this point. 
6 Decision theorists often distinguish between weak dominance (as defined here) and strong dominance (defined 
as strict inequality of value at all worlds). For dialectical reasons, I’ll focus on weak dominance here, since this 
makes for a stronger decision rule (that is, one that renders fewer attitudes permitted). 
7 Similar constraints have been employed by, e.g., Dorst (2019) and Pettigrew (2016b).  
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Here is a quick run-through of these assumptions.  
The first assumption, Ranking, says two things: (i) true belief is more valuable than 
suspension of judgment; and (ii) false belief is less valuable than suspension of judgment. 
These are meant as purely ordinal claims. Nothing is said about how much better (or worse) 
true (or false) belief is than suspension of judgment. It’s not even assumed that the difference 
in value between true belief and suspension of judgment stands in some particular ordinal 
relation to the difference in value between false belief and suspension of judgment. 
The second assumption, Extensionality, says that the value or disvalue of a given attitude 
depends solely on the truth-value of the relevant proposition. For example, the value or 
disvalue of believing q depends solely on whether q is true or false. This is what makes 
Veritism a form of monism about epistemic value: only true belief has fundamental epistemic 
value, and only false belief has fundamental epistemic disvalue.  
The third assumption, Equivalence, consists of three indifference claims: (i) there is no 
difference in value between believing a true proposition and disbelieving a false one; (ii) there 
is no difference in value between disbelieving a true proposition and believing a false one; and 
(iii) there is no difference in value between suspending judgment about a true proposition 
and suspending judgment about a false one. 
These three assumptions—Ranking, Extensionality and Equivalence—are ones that 
presumably all advocates of Veritism should be willing to accept. Later, in §4.2, I’ll consider 
some stronger and more controversial constraints that one might want to impose on the value 
function. But first I want to consider whether Minimal Veritism, when combined with 
Dominance, is sufficient to vindicate Belief Gamble Aversion. 
The answer turns out to be negative: even if the evidential probability of q is 50% or 
lower, it is consistent with Minimal Veritism that believing q isn’t dominated by suspending 
judgment about q (modulo the trivial case where the evidential probability of q is 0%). This 
is our first result (all proofs can be found in the Appendix): 
First Negative Result  
Dominance + Minimal Veritism ⇏ Belief Gamble Aversion. 
Given how weak Dominance and Minimal Veritism both are, this result may not seem all that 
surprising. But it serves to illustrate a challenge that will recur below: it turns out to be much 
harder to give a decision-theoretic vindication of Belief Gamble Aversion than one might 
have initially expected. In particular, Dominance and Minimal Veritism aren’t strong 
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enough. Hence, we are left to explore how these minimal assumptions might be strengthened 
so as to validate Belief Gamble Aversion. 
4. Vindicating Belief Gamble Aversion: Three Strategies 
In this section, I’ll explore three natural strategies for giving a decision-theoretic vindication 
of Belief Gamble Aversion. I’ll say more to clarify and motivate the strategies as we go, but 
here they are in rough outline: 
(1)  Replace Dominance by a stronger decision rule. 
(2)  Replace Minimal Veritism by a stronger set of constraints on the value function. 
(3) Appeal to “exogenous” principles that might be thought to have a bearing on the 
normative standing of belief gambles. 
Below I consider each strategy in turn, establish various results about them, and use these 
results to draw out some general lessons about the prospects for a decision-theoretic 
vindication of Belief Gamble Aversion. 
 4.1.   First Strategy: Risk-Averse Decision Rules 
As illustrated by our initial comparison of Mrs. Cautious and Mr. Hazard, we can understand 
Belief Gamble Aversion as a risk-averse norm—one that tells us to avoid error more 
vigorously than we pursue the truth. No wonder, then, that Dominance is of little help when 
it comes to validating Belief Gamble Aversion. After all, Dominance isn’t a risk-averse 
decision rule. It isn’t risk-seeking either. Dominance is simply silent on how risk-averse or 
risk-seeking you should be. For example, if you’re offered a gamble that gives you a 1% 
chance of winning $1 and a 99% chance of losing $1M, it would be extremely risk-seeking to 
take the gamble. Yet, for all Dominance says, doing so is permitted. Conversely, if you’re 
offered a gamble that gives you a 1% chance of losing $1 and a 99% chance of winning $1M, 
it would be extremely risk-averse to refuse to take the gamble. Yet, for all Dominance says, 
doing so is permitted. This makes it natural to think that we might be able to vindicate Belief 
Gamble Aversion by replacing Dominance with a risk-averse decision rule. But which one?  
A familiar candidate is the Maximin rule, which plays a central role in John Rawls’ 
(1971) theory of justice, and which has more recently been used by Richard Pettigrew (2016a) 
to give a decision-theoretic vindication of the Principle of Indifference. According to 
Maximin, you’re permitted to choose an option only if its worst outcome is at least as good 
as the worst outcome of any alternative option. For example, if you’re offered a gamble that 
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gives you a 99% chance of winning $1M and a 1% risk of losing $1, you aren’t permitted by 
Maximin to take the gamble, since the worst outcome of taking the gamble (losing $1) is 
worse than the worst outcome of not taking the gamble (losing nothing and winning 
nothing). 
When adapted to our framework, the Maximin rule becomes: 
Maximin 
You’re permitted to have an attitude, a, only if no other attitude, a’, worst-case dominates 
a, where a’ worst-case dominates a iff minw:P({w})>0[V(a’,w)] > minw:P({w})>0[V(a,w)]. 
Like Dominance, Maximin states merely a necessary condition on permissible attitudes: it 
says that worst-case dominated attitudes aren’t permitted, but it says nothing about whether 
attitudes that aren’t worst-case dominated are permitted. Maximin is sometimes formulated 
with a sufficient condition as well, but we only need the necessary condition here, since it 
turns out to be enough to validate Belief Gamble Aversion, when combined with Minimal 
Veritism. More precisely: whenever the evidential probability of q is 50% or lower, it follows 
from Minimal Veritism that believing q will be worst-case dominated by suspension of 
judgment about q. That’s our first positive result: 
First Positive Result 
Maximin + Minimal Veritism ⇒ Belief Gamble Aversion. 
This result shows—for what it’s worth—that it is indeed possible to validate Belief Gamble 
Aversion within our decision-theoretic framework. But, obviously, not any old derivation of 
Belief Gamble Aversion can serve as a satisfying vindication of the norm. At the very least, 
the assumptions that go into the derivation shouldn’t be too implausible or unmotivated. 
Unfortunately, the First Positive Result falls short in this regard, I think. 
The problem is that Maximin is an extremely risk-averse decision rule. It effectively tells 
us to only care about error-avoidance and forget all about truth-seeking. Consequently, 
someone who conforms to Maximin will only be prepared to believe propositions the truth 
of which she can be absolutely certain.8 And since there is almost always, if not always, at least 
a miniscule risk of being wrong, this means that someone who conforms to Maximin will 
hardly ever, if ever, form any beliefs at all. Presumably, rationality doesn’t demand such an 
                                               
8 More precisely: it follows from Maximin and Minimal Veritism that believing q is permitted only if P(q) = 1. 
The proof of this result is analogous to that of the First Positive Result, and I omit the details. 
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extreme level of epistemic risk-aversion. It might well be advisable to conform to Maximin in 
some contexts—say, when choosing one’s urpriors (cf. Pettigrew 2016a)—but it seems highly 
implausible to suppose that we should always conform to Maximin when making epistemic 
decisions. The same goes in the practical case: it might well be advisable to conform to 
Maximin in some practical contexts—say, when negotiating behind the veil of ignorance (cf. 
Rawls 1971)—but it seems highly implausible to suppose that we should always conform to 
Maximin when making practical decisions. 
Instead, one might try out a decision rule, which is stronger than Dominance, but which 
doesn’t share its problematic risk-averse features. The most salient candidate here is the 
standard rule of Expected Utility Maximization, which lies at the heart of orthodox decision 
theory. According to this decision rule, you should always choose an option whose expected 
value is at least as great as the expected value of any other option. For example, if you’re 
offered a gamble that gives you a 50% chance of winning $2 and a 50% risk of losing $1, you 
should take the gamble, since the expected value of taking the gamble is positive (more 
specifically, $1). By contrast, if you’re offered a gamble that gives you a 50% chance of 
winning $1 and a 50% risk of losing $2, you shouldn’t take the gamble, since the expected 
value of doing so is negative (more specifically, minus $1). 
When adapted to our framework, the rule of Expected Utility Maximization becomes: 
Risk-Neutral EUM 
You’re permitted to have an attitude, a, iff no other attitude, a’, has greater expected 
epistemic value than a, where the expected value, EP(a), of a relative to a probability 
function, P, is defined as: EP(a) = ∑wV(a,w)P(w). 
Unlike Dominance and Maximin, Risk-Neutral EUM includes both a necessary and a 
sufficient condition on permissible attitudes. Even so, however, Risk-Neutral EUM isn’t 
strong enough to validate Belief Gamble Aversion, when combined with Minimal Veritism. 
More precisely: even if the evidential probability of q is 50% or lower, it’s consistent with 
Minimal Veritism that the expected epistemic value of believing q is no smaller than the 
expected epistemic value of suspending judgment about q (modulo the trivial case where the 
evidential probability of q is 0%). This is our next result: 
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Second Negative Result9  
Risk-Neutral EUM + Minimal Veritism ⇏ Belief Gamble Aversion. 
I take this result to suggest that if we want to validate Belief Gamble Aversion without 
imposing any additional constraints on the value function, we need to adopt a decision rule 
with at least some risk-averse features. An entirely risk-neutral decision rule like Risk-Neutral 
EUM won’t do it. 
The previous two results—that is, the First Positive Result and the Second Negative 
Result—might be taken to suggest that we face a problem of moderation. Extremely risk-
averse decision rules like Maximin are overly prohibitive. Completely risk-neutral decision 
rules like Risk-Neutral EUM aren’t prohibitive enough. Is there a way to strike a middle 
ground? A natural idea would be to draw on Lara Buchak’s (2013) recent work on “risk-
weighted” utility theory. Very roughly, she characterizes a spectrum of decision rules, 
ranging from extremely risk-averse rules (akin to Maximin) to extremely risk-seeking ones 
(akin to Maximax). Perhaps we should be looking for a decision rule within this spectrum, 
which is neither too close to the risk-neutral middle, nor too close to the risk-averse extreme. 
However, I don’t find this strategy very promising—for at least two reasons. First, no 
moderately risk-averse decision rule is going to be strong enough to validate Belief Gamble 
Aversion, unless we impose additional constraints on the value function (that is, ones that go 
beyond Minimal Veritism).10 And, as we will see in §4.2, doing so quickly gets us into 
contentious territory. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, any moderately risk-averse 
decision rule faces essentially the same problem that led us to reject Maximin in the first place. 
Even if it is sometimes advisable to conform to a risk-averse decision rule, it’s hard to see why 
one should always do so. Why, for example, think that someone who conforms to Risk-
Neutral EUM on a given occasion is necessarily irrational for that reason? I don’t see any 
independent reasons to think so. Of course, there might be reasons to doubt that one should 
always conform to Risk-Neutral EUM. But to deny that it can ever be rational to conform to 
Risk-Neutral EUM seems like a desperate move. 
                                               
9 Since Risk-Neutral EUM is stronger than Dominance, this result can be seen as a corollary of the Second 
Negative Result. 
10 The formal details behind this claim would take us too far astray, but the informal story goes as follows: 
Minimal Veritism says nothing about how the value of true belief compares to the disvalue of false belief. Hence, 
we can always make the risk-weighted expected utility of believing q greater than the risk-weighted expected 
utility of suspending judgment about q, simply by making the value of true belief high enough compared to the 
disvalue of false belief. To eliminate this possibility, we would have to go beyond Minimal Veritism. 
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In sum, then, the first strategy doesn’t seem promising to me. We’d better look elsewhere 
for a decision-theoretic vindication of Belief Gamble Aversion. 
 4.2.   Second Strategy: Risk-Averse Value Functions 
Rather than adopting a risk-averse decision rule, perhaps we should adopt a risk-averse value 
function instead. Here is the weakest strengthening of Minimal Veritism that meets this 
objective:11 
Risk-Averse Veritism 
In addition to Minimal Veritism, the value function, V, must satisfy the following 
constraint, for all w ∈ q: 
|V(b,w) – V(s,w)| < |V(d,w) – V(s,w)| 
According to Risk-Averse Veritism, the absolute difference in value between true belief and 
suspension of judgment is smaller than the absolute difference in value between false belief 
and suspension of judgment. On the assumption that suspension of judgment has no value 
or disvalue (i.e., V(s,w) = 0), this amounts to saying, more simply, that the value of true belief 
is smaller than the disvalue of false belief (i.e., |V(b,w) < |V(d,w)|). Like Ranking, this is meant 
as a purely ordinal claim. Nothing is said about how much smaller the value of true belief is 
than the disvalue of false belief. All Risk-Averse Veritism says is that true belief isn’t as 
valuable as false belief is disvaluable. 
If we combine Risk-Averse Veritism with Risk-Neutral EUM, Belief Gamble Aversion 
follows. That is, whenever the evidential probability of q is 50% or lower, it follows from Risk-
Averse Veritism that the expected epistemic value of believing q is smaller than the expected 
epistemic value of suspending judgment about q. That’s our next result: 
Second Positive Result 
Risk-Neutral EUM + Risk-Averse Veritism ⇒ Belief Gamble Aversion. 
                                               
11 Similar constraints have been employed by Dorst (2017), Easwaran (2016), and Pettigrew (2016b) to capture 
the idea that one should place more weight on error-avoidance than on truth-seeking. 
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The upshot of this result is that any risk-averse value function is strong enough to establish a 
prohibition against belief gambles, when combined with Risk-Neutral EUM.12 
However, it seems to me that Risk-Averse Veritism raises more questions than it 
answers. What reason is there to think that the intrinsic disvalue of false belief is greater than 
the intrinsic value of true belief? Why not instead say that the intrinsic value of true belief is 
equal to or greater than the intrinsic disvalue of false belief? This question cries out for an 
answer. After all, it’s far from obvious that there should be an asymmetry between the value 
of true belief and the disvalue of false belief. On the contrary, positing such a value asymmetry 
strikes me with an air of puzzlement or mystery. What might the Veritist say to alleviate this 
reaction? 
I anticipate a temptation here to fall back on practical considerations to justify Risk-
Averse Veritism. Perhaps false beliefs tend to be more harmful than true beliefs are beneficial, 
from a practical point of view. The idea may sound plausible. But it isn’t available to the 
veritist. Whatever we say on behalf of the veritist to motivate Risk-Averse Veritism must be 
consistent with the view that truth and falsity are the sole bearers of fundamental epistemic 
value and disvalue, and that these values alone are what grounds epistemic norms. It might 
well be that the practical disvalue of false belief is (typically) greater than the practical value 
of true beliefs. But from the veritist’s perspective, we should resist the temptation to motivate 
Risk-Averse Veritism on practical grounds—to do so would be to give up the game. 
Relatedly, it might be tempting to invoke the Jamesian idea that the asymmetry between 
truth-seeking and error-avoidance is simply a feature of our human psychology, which isn’t 
subject to normative evaluation. Just as subjective Bayesians treat an agent’s “urpriors” as an 
arational matter, the idea goes, we should treat an agent’s propensity for epistemic risk 
aversion as an arational matter. This obviously raises the question of whether people in fact 
exhibit a sufficiently general propensity for epistemic risk aversion. But whatever the answer 
to this question is, this proposal isn’t available to the Veritist either, since it once again 
grounds the value or disvalue of a given belief in something other than the truth or falsity of 
that belief—this time in certain psychological features of the believer. 
An initially more promising suggestion, due to Kevin Dorst (2019, pp. 185), goes as 
follows. Consider two agents, Ann and Bob, whose doxastic states differ only in their attitude 
                                               
12 What if we combine Risk-Averse Veritism with Dominance instead of Risk-Neutral EUM? The answer is that 
Belief Gamble Aversion no longer follows, since Ranking implies that believing q won’t be dominated by 
suspending judgment about q (modulo the trivial case where P(q) = 0). The formal details behind this result are 
left to the reader. 
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towards q: Ann suspends judgment about q, whereas Bob believes both q and ~q. Suppose 
also that Ann and Bob possess the exact same evidence and that q and ~q are equally likely 
on that evidence. We can then ask: which belief state would a rational agent prefer to be in? 
Surely, Ann’s! But if Risk-Averse Veritism were false, it’s hard to see why this would be so. 
After all, if Risk-Averse Veritism were false, Bob’s belief state would instantiate just as much 
(if not more) epistemic value as Ann’s. So, Risk-Averse Veritism must be true—or so the 
suggestion goes. 
I don’t find this line of reasoning quite convincing, for reasons also put forth by Florian 
Steinberger (2019, §3). The problem, as I see it, is that it gets the explanatory direction wrong: 
it uses a premise about what is intuitively rational to establish a conclusion about what is 
epistemically valuable, whereas we’re looking for a premise about what is intuitively 
epistemically valuable to establish a conclusion about what is rational. This is obviously not 
to deny that people, when confronted with the case above, have a strong intuition that Ann 
is somehow “better off” than Bob, epistemically speaking. But what drives this intuition (at 
least insofar as I can tell) is that Bob is being irrational, whereas Ann isn’t (or, at any rate, 
need not be). And this is very different from saying that Ann’s belief state instantiates more 
epistemic value than Bob’s. 
At this point, it might wondered whether I’m being too hard on the Veritist. Am I asking 
for an explanation where none can be found? This would be the case if Risk-Averse Veritism 
encoded a “brute fact” about epistemic value, one that cannot be grounded in anything more 
fundamental. At the end of the day, explanation must stop somewhere. Why not here?  
My reluctance to treat Risk-Averse Veritism as a fundamental “bedrock” assumption 
stems from what I take to be a fairly uncontroversial methodological commitment, whereby 
the fundamental assumptions on which we base our epistemological theories should, to the 
extent possible, be relatively plausible on their face. At the very least, they shouldn’t strike us 
as outright puzzling or mysterious. But Risk-Averse Veritism does just that. I don’t consider 
this to be a decisive reason not to treat Risk-Averse Veritism as a fundamental assumption. 
Perhaps other considerations will tip the scale. But it seems to me that Risk-Averse Veritism 
isn’t the kind of principle that we should easily accept as part of our theoretical bedrock. 
Before I proceed to the third and final strategy, let me consider, for the sake of 





In addition to Minimal Veritism, the value function, V, must satisfy the following 
constraint, for all w ∈ q: 
|V(b,w) – V(s,w)| = |V(d,w) – V(s,w)| 
According to Risk-Neutral Veritism, the value of true belief equals the disvalue of false belief 
(assuming that suspending judgment has no value or disvalue). On the face of it, this 
assumption might seem less ad hoc than its risk-averse cousin. However, as will be 
unsurprising by now, Risk-Neutral Veritism isn’t strong enough to validate Belief Gamble 
Aversion, when combined with a risk-neutral decision rule like Risk-Neutral EUM. That’s 
our third negative result: 
Third Negative Result13  
Risk-Neutral EUM + Risk-Neutral Veritism ⇏ Belief Gamble Aversion. 
In sum, then, the second strategy doesn’t seem promising to me either. 
 4.3.   Third Strategy: “Exogenous” Constraints 
So far, I’ve examined various endogenous constraints on the decision-theoretic framework: 
that is, constraints that apply to various parts of the framework itself (specifically: the decision 
rule and the value function). But one might also try to constrain the framework in an 
exogenous way, by appealing to various independently plausible principles that aren’t integral 
to the decision-theoretic framework itself. Below I examine two such principles, which might 
be thought to have a bearing on the normative standing of belief gambles. 
The first principle is a familiar logical norm: 
Non-Contradiction 
You’re never permitted to believe a proposition and its negation both at once: 
b ∉ R(q ∧ ~q) 
                                               
13 This result has the Second Negative Result as a corollary, since Risk-Neutral Veritism is stronger than Minimal 
Veritism. Moreover, since Dominance is weaker than Risk-Neutral EUM, it is a corollary of the Third Negative 
Result that Dominance and Risk-Neutral Veritism do not jointly entail Belief Gamble Aversion. 
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Why think that Non-Contradiction bears on the normative standing of belief gambles? A 
tempting thought might be that Non-Contradiction straightforwardly entails Belief Gamble 
Aversion, because denying Belief Gamble Aversion amounts to saying that an agent can be at 
once permitted to believe q and permitted to believe ~q. However, this would be too quick: 
even if an agent is both permitted to believe q and permitted to believe ~q, the agent need not 
be permitted to believe both q and ~q at the same time. This is sometimes put by saying that 
permissions don’t (necessarily) agglomerate. That’s what drives the following result: 
Fourth Negative Result14,15 
Risk-Neutral EUM + Risk-Neutral Veritism + Non-Contradiction ⇏ Belief  
Gamble Aversion. 
I take this result to suggest that Non-Contradiction is not going to provide us with a 
straightforward vindication of Belief Gamble Aversion. Still, one might wonder whether 
Non-Contradiction can provide us with some kind of indirect vindication of Belief Gamble 
Aversion. This would arguably be the case if Belief Gamble Aversion turned out to be 
necessary in order to vindicate Non-Contradiction. However, it doesn’t turn out that way. 
We can derive Non-Contradiction from Dominance and Minimal Veritism alone: 
Third Positive Result16  
Dominance + Minimal Veritism ⇒ Non-Contradiction. 
                                               
14 This result has the Third Negative Result as a corollary, since Non-Contradiction is added as an additional 
premise. Moreover, since Dominance and Minimal Veritism are weaker than Risk-Neutral EUM and Risk-
Neutral Veritism, respectively, there are two immediate corollaries of the Fourth Negative Result: first, 
Dominance and Risk-Neutral Veritism do not jointly entail Belief Gamble Aversion; and, second, Risk-Neutral 
EUM and Minimal Veritism do not jointly entail Belief Gamble Aversion. 
15 Easwaran and Fitelson (2015, Theorem 6) present a similar result, which essentially shows that a norm against 
belief gambles can be used to derive a dominance principle and a non-contradiction principle, whereas the 
opposite entailment doesn’t hold. A detailed comparison to their discussion is beyond the scope of this paper, 
but it’s worth noting that their framework (as they define it) doesn’t allow for suspension of judgment: that is, 
agents must either believe or disbelieve any given proposition. 
16 Here is a subtlety: although Dominance and Minimal Veritism entail a norm against believing the conjunction 
of q and ~q, they don’t straightforwardly entail a norm against believing q and ~q separately. This is because 
believing q ∧ ~q amounts to having one false belief, whereas believing q and believing ~q amounts to having one 
false belief and one true belief. Thus, given only Minimal Veritism, the former option is dominated by 
suspension of judgment about q, whereas the latter isn’t. However, we can get a norm against believing q and 
~q separately by invoking a (widely held, albeit not uncontroversial) closure principle, whereby you’re 
18 
It is also worth noting that, even if Belief Gamble Aversion did turn out to feature in our 
best vindication of Non-Contradiction, this would not (it seems to me) do much to vindicate 
Belief Gamble Aversion itself. It might give us additional reason to think that Belief Gamble 
Aversion is true. But we have already granted this much. What we are after is a way to ground 
Belief Gamble Aversion in other, more basic principles that we find independently plausible. 
Moving on to the second exogenous principle, consider another familiar norm: 
Impermissivism17  
You’re never permitted to believe a proposition and permitted to disbelieve that 
proposition at the same time: 
{b, d} ⊈ R(q) 
Obviously, Impermissivism is contested—much more so than Non-Contradiction—and I 
won’t take a stance on it here.18 But I find it worth observing that there is a close relationship 
between Impermissivism and Belief Gamble Aversion: 
Fourth Positive Result 
Risk-Neutral EUM + Risk-Neutral Veritism + Impermissivism ⇒ Belief  
Gamble Aversion. 
What this result illustrates is that we can derive Belief Gamble Aversion from Impermissivism 
without making any risk-averse assumptions about our decision rule or value function.19 
                                               
permitted to believe q and ~q separately only if you’re permitted to believe q ∧ ~q. So, in any case, Belief Gamble 
Aversion is hardly needed to vindicate the idea that contradictory beliefs are irrational. 
17 Some epistemologists have discussed a stronger impermissivist thesis, which says that there is always a unique 
permissible attitude to have towards any given proposition (White 2005; Kelly 2013). The present formulation 
doesn’t imply this much, since it leaves open the possibility that one can be at once permitted to suspend 
judgment about q and permitted to believe (or disbelieve) q. I focus on this weaker version of the thesis, since it 
turns out to be strong enough to establish the Fourth Positive Result. 
18 For an overview of the recent epistemological debate on permissivism vs. uniqueness, see Kopec and 
Titelbaum (2016). 
19 What happens if we replace Risk-Neutral EUM by Dominance? Answer: Belief Gamble Aversion no longer 
follows, since Ranking ensures that believing q isn’t dominated by disbelieving q (modulo the trivial case where 
P(q) = 0). What happens if we replace Risk-Neutral Veritism by Minimal Veritism? Answer: Belief Gamble 
Aversion no longer follows, since Minimal Veritism says nothing about how the value of true belief compares 
to the disvalue of false belief. The details of both results are left out. 
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Despite this, however, I’m doubtful that Impermissivism can provide us with a satisfying 
vindication of Belief Gamble Aversion. For one thing, there is something methodologically 
suspect about invoking a highly controversial norm like Impermissivism to ground a 
relatively innocuous norm like Belief Gamble Aversion. For another thing, it turns out that 
we can straightforwardly derive Impermissivism from Belief Gamble Aversion, with no 
additional assumptions: 
Fifth Positive Result  
Belief Gamble Aversion ⇒ Impermissivism. 
I take this result to provide yet another reason not to ground Belief Gamble Aversion in 
Impermissivism. If anything, it seems more natural to treat Belief Gamble Aversion as the 
more basic norm of the two. 
There are no doubt other exogenous principles aside from Non-Contradiction and 
Impermissivism that one might try to bring to bear on Belief Gamble Aversion. But in light 
of the above, I see little reason for optimism on behalf of the third strategy. 
5. Conclusion 
Belief gambles are irrational. Few would deny it. But what makes it so? I’ve tried to address 
this question from the perspective of epistemic decision theory. Needless to say, I haven’t 
exhausted all imaginable strategies for providing a decision-theoretic vindication of Belief 
Gamble Aversion. But I have examined three natural candidates, with unpromising results: 
each strategy turned out to rest on implausible or unmotivated assumptions. That’s why I 
said in the beginning that epistemic decision theory faces a dilemma: it forces us to either (i) 
make unmotivated assumptions to secure a norm against belief gambles, or (ii) concede that 
belief gambles can be rational after all. 
Where to go from here? I suspect that few epistemologists—especially among those who 
think that it is your evidence that determines what you should believe—would be prepared 
to concede that belief gambles can be rational. Those who share this sentiment may take the 
upshot of this paper as an invitation to search for alternative ways of vindicating the idea that 
belief gambles are irrational. Perhaps deontological theories of rational belief are better suited 
for this purpose (Sylvan 2020). Or perhaps a knowledge-based account is the way to go 
(Williamson 2000). I won’t try to assess such alternatives here—they all deserve a much fuller 
discussion than I can hope to provide in these closing remarks. But whichever way we go, it 
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seems to me that we need to face up to the dilemma presented in this paper. Until we do, a 
notable gap will remain in our understanding of rational belief. 
Appendix 
This appendix contains proofs of the results in the main text. The formal framework is 
introduced in §2. Further definitions are introduced in §§3-4. Results are repeated here for 
convenience. To avoid clutter, I’ll write “P(w)” to denote the evidential probability of {w}. 
First Negative Result: Dominance + Minimal Veritism ⇏ Belief Gamble Aversion. 
Proof. We must define a model that satisfies Dominance and Minimal Veritism, but not Belief 
Gamble Aversion. Let W = {w1,w2}, q = {w1}, and P(q) = .5. The following specification of V 
is consistent with Minimal Veritism: 
V(b,w1) = V(d,w2) = 1 
V(s,w1) = V(s,w2) = 0 
V(d,w1) = V(b,w2) = -1 
Since no attitude dominates any other attitude relative to this value assignment, the following 
specification of R is consistent with Dominance: 
R(q) = {b,s,d} 
Thus, b ∈ R(q) and P(q) ≯ .5, contrary to Belief Gamble Aversion.    □ 
First Positive Result: Maximin + Minimal Veritism ⇒ Belief Gamble Aversion. 
Proof. We must show that any model that satisfies Maximin and Minimal Veritism must 
satisfy Belief Gamble Aversion as well. Begin by assuming that P(q) ≤ .5. Given this, there 
must be at least one world w such that q is false at w. By Ranking, it follows that V(b,w) < 
V(s,w’), for all w’ (where w’ may or may not be identical to w). But this is just to say that s 
worst-case dominates b. Thus, by Maximin, b ∉ R(q), as Belief Gamble Aversion dictates.   □ 
Second Negative Result: Risk-Neutral EUM + Minimal Veritism ⇏ Belief Gamble Aversion. 
Proof. We must define a model that satisfies Minimal Veritism and Risk-Neutral Expected 
Value Maximization, but not Belief Gamble Aversion. Let W = {w1,w2}, q = {w1}, and P(q) = 
.5. The following specification of V is consistent with Minimal Veritism: 
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V(b,w1) = V(d,w2) = 1 
V(s,w1) = V(s,w2) = 0 
V(d,w1) = V(b,w2) = -1 
Given this specification of P and V, it follows trivially that EP(b) = EP(s) = EP(d) = 0. Hence, 
the following specification of R is consistent with Risk-Neutral EUM: 
R(q) = {b,s,d} 
Thus, b ∈ R(q) and P(q) ≯ .5, contrary to Belief Gamble Aversion.    □ 
Second Positive Result: Risk-Neutral EUM + Risk-Averse Veritism ⇒ Belief  
Gamble Aversion. 
Proof. We must show that any model that satisfies Risk-Neutral EUM and Risk-Averse 
Veritism must satisfy Belief Gamble Aversion as well. Begin by letting P(q) ≤ .5, and assume 
(without loss of generality) that suspension of judgment has no value or disvalue, that is, 
V(s,w) = 0, for all w. Given this specification of P and V, it follows trivially that EP(s) = 0. Due 
to Extensionality, we can define two constants, v1 and v2, such that v1 denotes the value of 
V(b,w), for each w ∈ q, whereas v2 denotes the value of V(b,w), for each w ∈ ~q. The expected 
value of b is then given by: 
EP(b)  =  ∑w∈W V(b,w)∙P(w) 
=  ∑w∈q V(b,w)∙P(w) + ∑w∈~q V(b,w)∙P(w) 
=  ∑w∈q v1∙P(w) + ∑w∈~q v2∙P(w) 
=  v1∙P(q) + v2∙P(~q) 
Since P(q) ≤ .5 and P(q) + P(~q) = 1, it follows that P(q) ≤ P(~q). By Risk-Averse Veritism, 
v2 + v1 < 0. It is then easily shown that v1∙P(q) + v2∙P(~q) < 0, which means that EP(b) < EP(s). 
Thus, by Risk-Neutral EUM, b ∉ R(q), as dictated by Belief Gamble Aversion.    □ 
Third Negative Result: Risk-Neutral EUM + Risk-Neutral Veritism ⇏ Belief  
Gamble Aversion. 
Proof. The proof is immediate from the proof of the Second Negative Result.    □ 
Fourth Negative Result: Risk-Neutral EUM + Risk-Neutral Veritism + Non- 
Contradiction ⇏ Belief Gamble Aversion. 
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Proof. We must define a model that satisfies Non-Contradiction, Risk-Neutral EUM, and 
Risk-Neutral Veritism, but not Belief Gamble Aversion. Let W = {w1,w2}, q = {w1}, and P(q) 
= .5. The following specification of V is consistent with Risk-Neutral Veritism: 
V(b,w1) = V(d,w2) = 1 
V(s,w1) = V(s,w2) = 0 
V(d,w1) = V(b,w2) = -1 
Relative to this value assignment, the following specification of R is easily shown to be 
consistent with Non-Contradiction and Risk-Neutral EUM: 
R(q ∧ ~q) = {d} 
R(q) = {b,s,d} 
Thus, b ∈ R(q) and P(q) ≯ .5, contrary to Belief Gamble Aversion.    □ 
Third Positive Result: Dominance + Minimal Veritism ⇒ Non-Contradiction. 
Proof. We must show that any model that satisfies Dominance and Minimal Veritism must 
satisfy Non-Contradiction as well. Since q ∧ ~q is false at every world in every model (that is, 
q ∧ ~q = {} in every model), it follows as an immediate consequence of Ranking that V(s,w) 
> V(b,w), for every w in every model, which means that s dominates b. Thus, by Dominance, 
b ∉ R(q ∧ ~q), as dictated by Non-Contradiction.    □ 
Fourth Positive Result: Risk-Neutral EUM + Risk-Neutral Veritism + Impermissivism ⇒ 
Belief Gamble Aversion. 
Proof. We must show that any model that satisfies Risk-Neutral EUM, Risk-Neutral Veritism 
and Impermissivism must satisfy Belief Gamble Aversion as well. We begin by assuming that 
P(q) = .5. Given Risk-Neutral Veritism, it is then easy to see that EP(b) = EP(d). By Risk-
Neutral EUM, it follows that {b,d} ⊆ R(q) or {b,d} ⊈ R(q). But Impermissivism excludes the 
former option, which means that {b,d} ⊈ R(q) and (a fortiori) b ∉ R(q), as dictated by Belief 
Gamble Aversion.    □ 
Fifth Positive Result: Belief Gamble Aversion ⇒ Impermissivism. 
Proof. We prove the contrapositive. Suppose that {b,d} ⊆ R(q), contra Impermissivism. Since 
disbelieving q is assumed to be equivalent to believing ~q, this supposition amounts to saying 
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that b ∈ R(q) and b ∈ R(~q). Since P(q) + P(~q) = 1 in any model, we get that P(q) ≯ .5 or 
P(~q) ≯ .5. Thus, either b ∈ R(q) and P(q) ≯ .5 or b ∈ R(~q) and P(~q) ≯ .5, contra Belief 
Gamble Aversion.    □ 
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